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NOTES AND MEMORANDA 
THE UNITED STATES TARIFF ACT OF 1897. 
FOR the third time in' the short space of seven years, the tariff of 
the United States has been completely remodelled; and for the second 
time in three years its general policy has been completely revised. In 
1890 the McKinley tariff strengthened and even exaggerated the policy 
of high protection which had prevailed for a generation. In 1894 the 
Wilson Tariff Act made a considerable reduction of duties, with an 
avowed intention in the party then dominant to move away from the 
policy of protection. Now in 1897 the Dingley Tariff Act once more 
reaffirms the policy of protection, and in some ways carries it even 
farther than did its predecessor of 1890.1 
All of these successive measures are closely connected with the 
general political situation, and with the elections immediately preced- 
ing their enactment. The Act of 1890 was passed at the first session 
of Congress after the election of 1888, when President Harrison was 
chosen to succeed the advocate of tariff reform, President Cleveland. 
That of 1894 similarly was passed after the second election of President 
Cleveland and the defeat of President Harrison in 1892. That of 1897 
follows the election of President McKinley and the victory of the 
Republicans in 1896. The legislation of the present year has come 
even more promptly after the general election than was the case with 
its predecessors. Instead of waiting for the regular session of Congress 
in 1897-98 (the session which is to begin in December of this year), 
President McKinley called an extra session of Congress immediately on 
his inauguration, and at that extra session, with the greatest possible 
despatch, the new tariff measure was passed. 
1 Popular phraseology attaches to each of these measures the name of the 
Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means in the House of Representatives 
for the time being. Mr. McKinley was chairman in 1890, Mr. Wilson in 1894, 
Mr. Dingley in 1897. Each measure, however, was much modified by the legisla- 
ture, after-presentation by the respective committees, and no such responsibility for 
the details of the measures is chargeable to the committees or the chairman as would 
be chargeable, under analogous conditions, to the British Cabinet or the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. 
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Notwithstanding this exceptional promptness, the Act of 1897 rests 
much less clearly on an expression from the popular will than the 
earlier measures. The election of 1896 turned on the monetary ques- 
tion, not on the tariff question. If its first fruit nevertheless was a 
new tariff measure, this result is to be ascribed to the general overturn 
of political forces and combinations brought about by the contest 
between gold and silver. Briefly stated, the course of events has been 
as follows. Before the campaign of 1896 the Republicans had not been 
desirous -of making the issue on the gold and silver question. Their 
candidate, it had been practically settled, was to be Mr. McKinley,'and 
their campaign cry was to be " Protection and Prosperity." But in the 
Democratic party the silver element triumphed, nominated Mr. Bryan 
on a free silver platform, and contemptuously shoved aside the tariff 
issue. The Democratic nomination came first; they forced the fighting, 
and compelled the Republicans, standing on the defensive, to proclaim 
for the gold standard. On that issue the election was fought, and the 
Republicans triumphed. But though they elected their President and 
a strong majority in the House of Representatives, the Senate, whose 
composition under our political system can change but gradually, 
remained nearly evenly divided on the money question. The leaders 
of the Republicans, and more particularly Mr. McKinley, had from the 
outset been desirous of laying the greater stress on the tariff. They 
found themselves face to face with a difficult situation in the Senate. 
The condition of the Treasury, with a considerable current deficit, 
called for revenue legislation of some sort. Hence they were easily led 
to devote the extra session solely to the tariff; on this their party was 
united, on this they felt sure of securing ready action, and this after all 
was their first love. And so, oddly enough, the immediate outcome of 
the election of 1896 was legislation, not on the subject which had been 
inainly before the people, but on the subject which had been displaced 
and had apparently become an issue of the past. 
These circumstances, which explain the enactment of the new Tariff 
Act, serve also in large part to explain its characteristics. While 
affirming the policy for which the Republican party in late years has 
stood, and while passed with unusual promptness on the ground of 
urgent treasury need, it is designed also to conciliate various sections 
,of the community to which the free silver party had held out a bait, 
and which it was desired to bring back within the Republican party 
fold. The silver party had made a strong appeal to the farmers of the 
central West, and had of course had its stronghold in the mining states 
of the far West. Various provisions in the Act, to which attention will 
be called presently, are designed to give to the agricultural states and 
the mining and ranching states a share of the blessings of protection. 
But, when all is said, there remain other provisions not to be ascribed to 
the unexpected and embarrassing political situation with which the 
Republicans were confronted. In a considerable number of cases the 
protective system was extended solely for the sake of protection. On 
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a good number of manufactured commodities in which the states 
politically doubtful had no concern, a ready and even effusive welcome 
was extended to demands for higher duties. Evidently the defeats 
which the Republicans had suffered at the polls in 1890 and 1892, 
when the issue was the policy of protection as embodied in the McKinley 
Tariff Act, had- not convinced the leaders that extreme protection was 
unpopular. 
One other aspect of the political fencing deserves to be noted. In the 
campaign of 1896, the silver party had posed as the -friend, not only of 
the farmer, but of the labouring man and of the' down-trodden 
masses. The Republicans' of course had maintained that they, too, 
were solicitous for the labouring man's welfare, which they proposed 
to promote by high duties as a means of maintaining high wages. 
What- may be called the pauper labour argument for protection- 
"protection for American labour" is the favourite catch-word-has 
been the burden of their song for half-a-century; and it was shouted 
with redoubled vigour as an answer to the appeals of the silver men in 
1896. In fact, it has become almost an axiom that every producer is 
entitled to such duties as are needed to " equalise the labour cost " in 
the United States and in countries of lower money wages. Hence 'a 
generous willingness to aid any and every employer who alleges that', 
unless he is bolstered up by higher duties, he cannot pay his workmen 
American wages and still compete with the pauper labour of Europe. 
Four years ago, when describing in the columns of this JOURNAL the 
Tariff Act of 1894, I was so rash as to predict that the free admission 
of wool, provided for by that measure, was a change which had come 
for good. The common fate of prophets has overtaken me; in the 
Act of 1897 the duty on wool has been restored. Not only that, but 
the rate is even (on some grades of wool) higher than in the Protective 
Act of 1890. That earlier measure had already increased the duty on 
wool. Now it goes one notch farther up. The amount of change was 
not great in either case, and in the Act of the current year the advance 
is mainly on the cheaper grades of wool known as carpet wool. But 
even when regarded as the simple reimposition of the duties which 
had been abolished (temporarily as it proves) in* 1894, the new duties 
on wool are the most significant in the whole measure. The rate is 
11 cents a pound on clothing wool, and 12 cents on combing wool, 
The distinction between these two grades of wool is largely artificial, 
and maintains itself chiefly by force of tradition on our statute book. 
On either grade, the duties are high; compared with foreign prices of 
wool, the rates are equivalent to 50, 60, and sometimes even to 80 and 
100 per cent. 
It must seem surprising that a great industrial country like the 
United States, alone among civilised nations, should retain a duty on 
this'most important raw material. It must seem more surprising when 
we consider that imported wool is unquestionably needed for a great 
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manufacturing industry; while the agricultural population, so far from 
having ordinarily to meet foreign competition on its own ground, is the 
dreaded competitor of the farmers of other countries. Yet the reten- 
tion of the duty is the logical outcome. of the policy of all-embracing 
protection. When protection is advocated, not on the ground of care- 
ful nurture of promising new industries, not on the ground of a diversity 
of pursuits desirable for social and political reasons, not on the ground 
of political and military independence, but because of the general 
largesses which it is alleged to distribute, because it stimulates domestic 
industry and raises all wages and all profits, and prevents unnecessary 
tribute to the foreigner for payment of expensive imports,-then in 
consistency it becomes impossible to say "no " to any domestic producer, 
unless he be obviously out of court because of insuperable climatic 
obstacles. And this is the position which the Republican party has 
taken. Everything which can be produced within the country is to be 
produced, and the importation of only those things is to be permitted 
which a physical obstacle prevents the home producer from under- 
taking. Hence we find in the Tariff Act protection not only for the 
wool of the West, but for the oranges and fruits of California and 
Florida, for the hides of the cattle-raising states; we hear much talk 
of the advantage which a higher duty on sugar will bring in stimulat- 
ing a domestic beet-sugar industry; and we find an open ear, even 
though for the moment no action, for suggestions that climatic obstacles 
after all may not be insuperable, as in the case of tea. When it comes 
to wool, this general cordial welcome among the dominant protectionists 
to any and every plan for stimulating a domestic industry, becomes 
still warmer, because here is a counter move against the Democrats. 
The silver party had posed as the special friend of the agricultural 
producer. By raising the duty on his wool, the Republicans present 
themselves as also fostering friends. 
While there is a duty on wool, intended for the benefit of the 
farmer, that duty will almost certainly inure chiefly to the advantage of 
the ranchmen of the more distant western states. In the United States, 
as in the rest of the world, sheep-raising and cattle-raising, under modern 
conditions of transportation, tend to be transferred in large part to 
semi-arid regions where settled agriculture is not possible. For Europe 
this tendency brings it about that distant countries like Australia, 
Argentina, the Cape of Good Hope, become great sources of supply for 
meat, wool, hides. In the United States the same tendency shows 
itself, partly in similar trade with the countries mentioned, and partly 
in the development of ranching industry on the great plains in the far 
west of our own country. The effect of the tariff restrictions will 
doubtless be not that wool-raising will be much stimulated in the 
farming regions proper, but that international trade (such it is in the 
one case as much as in the other) will be deflected to the ranching 
regions within the country rather than without the country. The 
economist may infer with confidence that the geographical division of 
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labour would be more advantageous without these restrictions than 
with them; but this is a stage in the analysis of the situation which 
the staunch protectionist cannot be expected to reach. So far as the 
gain to the ranching states was concerned, this was frankly admitted, 
and indeed was one of the important political factors bearing on the 
new Tariff Aot. The Senators from these states hold something 
very like the balance of power in the evenly-divided Upper House, and 
their support was bid for. Particularly high duties were imposed on 
the coarser kinds of wool, classified as carpet wool, whose importation 
was supposed to interfere more especially with the wools produced in 
their states. A duty, new in our tariff history, was also imposed on 
hides, again- by way of protection to the cattle ranchers. It is difficult 
to justify this extraordinary imposition; but it is easy to explain it. It 
is a logical outcome of the policy of all-embracing protection; and it is 
a sop to states politically in doubt. 
With the revived duties on wool comes once more the elaborate 
system of compound duties on woollen goods; sufficient both to com- 
pensate the woollen manufacturer for the high charges on his raw 
material, and to give him, over and above such compensation, sub- 
stantial protection on his own account. For more than a generation 
-this result has been aimed at, in our Tariff Acts, by a combination of 
-specific and ad valorem duties on woollen goods; the specific duties 
,being supposed to be simply compensatory, while the ad valorem duties 
-afford independent protection. In the main, the result here is a return 
-to the duties on woollen goods as they were fixed in the McKinley Act 
of 1890. Yet there is some upward trend. On the classes of cloths 
and dress goods, which have been most largely imported, the ad 
valorem or protective duty creeps up from 50 to 55 per cent. The 
total duty on these goods, specific and ad valorem (i.e. compensatory 
and protective) combined, is in most cases nearly 100 per cent., and in 
some cases considerably exceeds 100 per cent. Protection is applied 
with no faltering hand. 
In other directions also there is an unhesitating maintenance of the 
protective policy, and an extension of it where previous legislation had 
permitted importation on a large scale, and domestic producers promised 
that under " proper encouragement " they could supply the market. 
Thus the duties on silk goods are changed from ad valorem to specific 
form, and in the transformation become appreciably heavier. Certain 
linen goods also are subjected to specific in place of ad valorem duties; 
and here too the change brings a substantial advance. On cotton manu- 
factures the changes are of less moment than on other textile fabrics. 
On the other hand, the cruder forms of iron and steel are admitted 
at lower duties. The extraordinary change which has taken place in 
the United States within the last ten or fifteen years in the conditions 
of iron production, have been so much discussed of late that it will 
suffice to note their bearing on our tariff legislation. Production has 
advanced at a portentous rate; and from various causes, little con- 
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nected with tariff legislation, the expenses of production have been 
lowered and prices have fallen. Protection, which was clamorously 
demanded twenty years ago, is now felt to be little needed. Wool has 
displaced iron as the centre of the protective controversy. The cruder 
forms of iron and steel are not likely to be imported into the United 
States, except in scattered quantities, under any circumstances. 
Duties on them are retained in the new Act, largely for form's sake; 
but they have been somewhat reduced. The changes probably signify 
little more than so many changes in the figures on the statute book. 
On the other hand, a slight increase is made in the duties on minerals 
in the crudest form of all, namely, on iron ore and on coal. As to 
these, geographical proximity tends to bring about importation in 
certain outlying districts which happen to be far removed from the 
main domestic sources of supply. It might seem to be rational to 
allow the geographical situation to work out its effects undisturbed, 
and to permit coal and iron ore to be secured from whatever spot 
might happen to be most handy. But the severe logic of consistent 
protection steps in and declares that here, as elsewhere, the domestic 
producer, and he alone, should have control of the domestic market. 
A considerable place in popular discussion has been taken bythe duties 
on sugar. The so-called Sugar Trust, which has practicalty a mono- 
poly of the sugar refining industry, is perhaps the best known of the 
industrial combinations. Each of the political parties has been in the 
habit of charging the other with giving aid and comfort to the mono- 
poly, through protection on refined sugar; and each party has had 
sufficient grounds for making the charges. When the Tariff Act of 
1894 was passed, much was made of the retention of the differential, 
that is higher, rate on refined sugar than on raw sugar; though in this 
respect the Act of 1894 went no farther than its predecessors-in fact 
did not go so far. In the present Act, the duty on raw sugar is con- 
siderably advanlced, while the additional or differential duty on refined 
sugar remains where it was. The increase in the duty on raw sugar is 
designed mainly to bring to the Treasury a much needed increase of 
revenue. Oddly enough, a great deal is also said of the stimulus which 
it will give to the beet-sugar industry in the United States. It is 
obvious that so far as the domestic production of sugar from beets 
extends, the financial gain from the import duty will be lost. But the 
talk about beet-sugar is largely sentimental. Outside of California, 
where some considerable experiments have been made, the beet-sugar 
industry is in the very earliest stages. It is questionable whether it 
will attain any growth for a long time to come, and at all events the 
additional duty on raw sugar mnay be relied upon to yield the expected 
increase of revenue for as long a time in the future as it is possible for 
financial legislation to provide for. 
Last among the provisions of the Act, should be mentioned some 
tentative and unpromising movements towards reciprocity. These 
appear in two forms. In the first place, the President is authorised 
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to suspend the free admission of certain articles, of which tea and 
coffee are alone of much importance, if it appears that other coun- 
tries sending these articles to the United States impose duties that 
are "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable." He is also authorised 
to suspend-certain duties imposed in the Act, and to replace them by 
lower-duties " after securing reciprocal and reasonable concessions" 
on- the part of the countries whence these articles come. These reduc- 
tions may be applied to argol (crude tartar), brandies, champagne, 
wines, paintings, statuary. The list indicates clearly enough the 
country-here aimed at-France. It seems to be feared' that France 
may resort -to reprisals for the higher duties on her silks, and the 
United States so adjusts her duties as to be prepared in advance to 
affer- reductions, in return for the maintenance of the status quto on the 
part of France. 
Of- wider scope, but so limited as probably to be quiite without; 
effect, is the second move towards reciprocity. The President may 
conclude treaties, providing for genera,] reductions of duty, up to 20 per 
cent., from those imposed by the new Act. But these treaties must 
be made within two years after the passage of the Act, must be limited 
to a term not exceeding five years, and must be approved by the Con-- 
gress of the United States. It is highly improbable that with these 
limitations they will result in any arrangements with foreign countries. 
On the whole,- the new Tariff Act is a source of sad disappointment 
to those who hoped to feel in our political life a new breath, a fresher 
air, after the storm of 1896. As a matter for legislative disposal, the 
tariff question in the United States must be, not whether there shall 
be protection or free trade, but whether there shall be more or less 
extreme, more or less universal protection. Most cool-headed persons 
would say the system had been carried far enough; and this seems to 
be the view even of good Republicans, loyal to the protection principle, 
but sceptical whether it has not been carried too far. New and 
burning questions are coming to the fore; the silver question first, and 
behind it social questions of wide import. So far as the first step 
goes, the party leaders seem disposed to cling to their old battle-cry, 
protectioni to American industry and to American labour. 
It is true that the Congress elected in 1896 has held only the 
short extra session, and that no serious effort was made to attend 
to anything but the tariff. It is intimated that the monetary prob- 
lem will be taken in hand at the regular session beginning this 
month (December, 1897). It remains to be seen whether any steps 
will then be taken towards that reform in the currency system whose 
need every cool observer must admit, but which the Republican leaders 
hitherto have been disposed to pooh-pooh. Meanwhile, to repeat, the 
new Tariff Act is sadly disappointing, not only from the fact that it was 
the sole outcome of the first opportunity for legislation, but from the 
manner in which it was passed, and from the nature of its provisions. 
F. W. TAUSSIG. 
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